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Abstract:  This essay has as a keystone the 
words in which Husserl identifies life with the 
flux of lived experiences. It attempts a phe-
nomenological approach to primary conscious-
ness. Starting from the reduction to the sphere 
of “my ownness”, it then makes reference to 
the issue of the “living present” (two important 
themes where life is at stake); afterwards, it 
goes to the notion of reason in Husserl in its 
relationship with life and the lived experiences 
of the feeling of being alive, such as “connatus” 
as originary intuition, and the concept, stem-
ming from Ortega y Gasset, of “living reason” 
(razón vital). As a last issue, a description is 
made of those features of life expounded by 
Husserl that can be interpreted in reference to 
“the green of the golden tree”. 
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Resumen: Este estudio tiene como clave de 
bóveda la frase en que Husserl identifica la vida 
con el fluir de las vivencias. Intenta una 
aproximación fenomenológica a la conciencia 
primaria. Parte de la reducción al ámbito de ”lo 
mío propio”. A continuación se hace referencia 
al tema del “presente viviente” (dos temas 
importantes caracterizados por la vida); luego 
se pasa  a la concepción de la razón en Husserl 
en relación con la vida y las vivencias del sen-
timiento de vivir, tales como “conatus” como 
intuición originaria, y al concepto orteguiano de 
razón vital. Como última cuestión, se estudian 
los rasgos de la vida expuestos por Husserl que 
puedan ser interpretados con  referencia a “el 
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Young friend, every theory is grey. 




Although Goethe’s words (chosen as epigraph) refer to a tree, this study 
does not deal with life in nature. Its issues are the following: 1) It deals with 
some of Husserl’s texts on life. 2) In order to approach to the primal conscious-
ness, a reduction is performed to the sphere of “my ownness”. 3) The “living 
present”. 4) The idea of reason by Husserl, and feelings such as “conatus” and 
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1. A TEXT ON LIFE 
 
The starting point is a text of the First of the Cartesian Meditations (I CM). 
Therein, after considering formal and material regions as index of transcenden-
tal systems of evidences, it leads back to 
 
the synthesis of objective perceptions and other objective intuitions, which extends 
throughout the unity of life as a whole, and is such, that the world is at all times in-
tended –and can become thematic– as a unit. Consequently the world is a universal 
problem of egology, as is likewise the whole of conscious life, in its immanent tem-
porality, when we direct our regard to the purely immanent realm.1 
 
This text is significant inasmuch as it identifies conscious life and immanent 
time. 
In § 9 of the I CM, Husserl explicitly acknowledges being indebted to Des-
cartes, concerning “the fundamental transcendental method of epojé, as far as 
it goes back to the last reality: I myself as the pure ego with the stream of my 
cogitations”2. 
 
If we take the unitary objective world as a transcendental clue, it leads back to the 
synthesis of objective perceptions and other objective intuitions, which extends 
throughout the unity of life as a whole, and is such that the world is at all times in-
tended –and can become thematic– as a unit. Consequently the world is a universal 
problem of egology, as is likewise the whole of conscious life, in its immanent tem-
porality, when we direct our regard to the purely immanent realm. 
 
Even if it is true that the past of the corresponding subjectivity depends on 
memory3, it cannot be said that memory is apodictic, but, Husserl says, the 





1 E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. English version by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960; p. 
53. The emphasis is mine. 
2 Ibidem, p. 53. 
3 Ibidem, cf. § 24, pp. 57-58. 
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2. THE PRIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS. THE SPHERE OF MY “OWNNESS” 
 
Our next step circumscribes the realm of my “ownness”, according to Hus-
serl’s procedure in the V CM. In order to grasp the primal consciousness, reduc-
tion should be applied to all alien experience, i.e. the world or the other exist-
ing-fellows, as they are alien to the field of my consciousness of myself. After-
ward, only the experience of being a psychophysical being in the world among 
others remains; the very sense of the word “world” is “being such for anybody”. 
Although the world and the others have been reduced, I am constituted as 
member of the world, together with the exterior multiplicity. 
What is manifest in the sphere of my ownness, is the transcendental ego. 
My ownness consists in the manifestation of actualities and potentialities of the 
flow of experiences. 
 
I, the reduced “human Ego” (“psychophysical” Ego), am constituted, accordingly, as 
a member of the “world” with a multiplicity of “objects outside me”. But I myself 
constitute all this in my “psyche” and bear it intentionally within me. If perchance it 
could be shown that everything constituted as part of my peculiar ownness, includ-
ing then the reduced “world”, belonged to the concrete essence of the constituting 
subject as an inseparable internal determination, then, in the Ego’s self-explication, 
his peculiarly own world would be found as “inside” and, on the other hand, when 
running through that world straightforwardly, the Ego would find himself as a 
member among its “externalities” and would distinguish between himself and “the 
external world”.4 
 
We now ask how I, the Ego reduced to what is purely my own and, as thus 
reduced, included in the similarly reduced world-phenomenon and, on the other 
hand, I as transcendental ego, are related to one another. The transcendental 
ego emerged by virtue of my “parenthesizing” of the entire Objective world and 
all other (including all ideal) Objectivities. In consequence of this parenthesiz-
ing, I have become aware of myself as the transcendental ego, who constitutes 
in his constitutive life everything that is ever Objective for me – the ego of all 
constitutions, who exists in his actual and potential life processes and Ego-
habitualities and who constitutes in them not only everything Objective but also 
 
 
4 Ibidem, p. 99 
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himself as identical ego. We can say now: In that I, as this ego, have constitut-
ed and am continually further constituting as a phenomenon (as a correlate) 
the world that exists for me, I have carried out a mundanizing self-
apperception, under the title “Ego in the usual sense”, in corresponding consti-
tutive syntheses and am maintaining a continuing acceptance and further de-
velopment of it5. 
Senses, my own body, appear in my primordial sphere; thereby a kind of 
mediating intentionality can be seen. 
As far as I know, Husserl did not systematically develop the issue “life”. 
However, in his terminology two words: “lifeworld” and “flowing living present”, 
are names for important realms of his philosophy. 
 
 
3. THE LIVING PRESENT 
 
May we speak about change in an authentic sense, if it is not possible to 
imagine non-change as a stable, not altered duration in the living present? 
In the permanent flowing stream of the phenomenal phases, no possible 
change can be introduced. 
There is no duration in the primal stream insofar as duration is the form of 
something that lasts, of an identity, through the temporal series that appears 
as being its duration. 
 
But is there not something very peculiar here? Can one speak in the strict sense of 
change in a situation in which, after all, constancy, duration filled out without 
change, is inconceivable? No possible constancy can be attributed to the continuous 
flow of appearance-phases. 
There is no duration in the original flow. For duration is the form of something en-
during, of an enduring being, of something identical in the temporal sequence that 
functions as its duration. In the case of processes such as a thunderstorm, the mo-
tion of a shooting star, and so on, we have to do with unitary complexes of changes 
in enduring objects. Objective time is a form of “persisting” objects, of their chang-
es and of other processes involved in them. “Process” is therefore a concept pre-
supposing persistence. But persistence is unity that becomes constituted in the 
flow, and it pertains to the essence of the flow that no persistence can exist in it. 
Phases of experience and continuous series of phases exist in the flow. But such a 
 
 
5 Ibidem, pp. 99-100. 
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phase is nothing that persists, any more than a continuous series of such phases is. 
To be sure, in a way it is also an objectivity. I can direct my regard towards a 
phase that stands out in the flow or towards an extended section of the flow, and I 
can identify it in repeated re-presentation, return to the same section again and 
again, and say: this section of the flow. And so too for the entire flow, which in the 
proper way, I can identify as this one flow. But what has been identifying, this iden-
tifying is not the unity of something that persists and it can never be such a unity. 
It belongs to the essence of persistence that what persists can persist as either 
changing or unchanging. Every change idealiter can pass over into a condition of 
constancy, every motion to rest and every rest into motion, and every qualitative 
change into a condition of qualitative constancy. The duration is then filled with 
“the same” phases.6 
 
In events such as a storm, or the movement of a fiery meteor, etc., objec-
tive time is constituted and analyzed through the static approach of phenome-
nology, as well as through the genetic one, that also implies the regressive en-
quiry.  
The phenomenological static approach entails an imaginary detaining of 
flowing experiences. 
The static approach had been used to explore the constitution of objects. 
Since the twenties Husserl applies the genetic approach, resulting in an enrich-
ment of the phenomenological thematic. It allows him to look for the primal 
source of constitution. The constitutive grounds of the performing of meanings, 
by means of the passive synthesis, goes back up to the instinctive activity. 
 
 
4. HUSSERL’S IDEA OF REASON 
 
Husserl’s idea of reason relates to three ways of conscious experiences. 
The foundational character of perception is usually accepted as a starting 
point of objectification. In Logische Untersuchungen (LU)7, Husserl deals with 
the meaning  of the foundational viewpoint, highlighting the ambiguity of the 
word “presentation”; although it is possible to refer by means of it to what will 
afterward be known as “objectifying acts”. Its strict meaning concerns the per-
formance that justifies the object being presented in a certain way by the ob-
 
 
6  E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Trans. John Bar-
nett Brough, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 118. 
7  E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Ed. Ursula Panzer, Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1950. 
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jectifying act; such is the sense (see LU 475-76), that definitively relates to the 
foundational act. Perception as objectifying act is accepted as a starting point. 
Afterward this priority decreases. 
Later on, Husserl refers to not objectifying acts, and holds as acceptable 
the assertion that our grasping an object can from the very beginning be some-
thing else than perception; i.e. from the very beginning our experience can in-
clude affective characters. From the beginning things appear as agreeable or 
disagreeable, good or evil, attractive or repulsive. The orientation of eagerness 
functions the same way motivation does. According to Husserl, motivation is 
the fundamental law of spiritual life. 
The practical function is the third way in which experiences take place. 
Moved affection means aspiration or wish, be it positive or negative, i.e. result-
ing from an approaching movement or from a flight. Here we have reached the 
realm of action: that to what we aspire to or that which is rejected. This per-
formance is intertwined with the all-embracing form, “teleology”. Husserl calls 
teleology “the form of all forms”. Motive is attracted by the correlative goal; so 
that motivation is inseparable from teleology. The movement forwards also 
characterizes perceptive acts, that always tend to reach the highest possible 
degree of fulfillment. Inasmuch as affectivity is affected, there appears eager-
ness toward the good in which the affective value is embodied. In this way the 
practical realm becomes manifest, i.e. the realm of action tending to the aim it 
longs to reach. 
What appears can be neutral, it is perceived according to our interests, or 
to pre-occupation, i.e., our project. In Hussserl’s Lectures on Ethics 1908-1914, 
he holds that there is a certain order that organizes the different modes of ex-
perience, and that descriptive experience precedes the evaluative one, and that 
the latter precedes the practical one. 
Now we look after the archeology of instincts, which are the earliest forms 
of progressive experience. The sphere of instincts is unveiled by means of the 
phenomenological genetic retrospective inquiry. “Primal instincts are the primal 
beginning of transcendental genesis”. 
In the constitution of what is worldly in experience, there appear 
habitualities intertwined with instincts, thus it is possible to affirm a primal in-
stitution as being the essential form of the genesis (Ms. B III 3, pp. 1, 7). In 
this context Husserl alludes to our “transcendental birth” (Ms. E III, 9; p. 4). 
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This phrase neither concern the moment in which an active personal center, 
oriented toward the world, is able to constitute an object; nor the moment in 
which it disposes of the latent dispositions to work that way. The phrase refers 
to the beginning of the transcendental genesis; and is an originary presupposi-
tion concerning that genesis (Ms. K 11; p. 2).  Original creative acts are the 
first ones in themselves. How does this state of affairs relate to the original 
awakening (birth)? Does it concern a pre-I as a referential center that has not 
yet a world, nor is a person? “Transcendental birth” does not allude to a child 
being born, as the newly born child is already an experiencing center of higher 
degree, it already has acquired experience, that starts in the maternal womb, it 
has perceptions and a perceptional horizon, together with which come other 
data of a different kind, new acquisitions on the basis of what has already been 
acquired; it is an “I of higher habitualities”8. 
These assertions mean that the beginning of the transcendental genesis 
ought to be looked for even further, in a remote horizon of past, in the moment 
in which the primal ego was conceived and by means of the congenital instincts 
that are waking up and orient themselves toward its world, i.e. the maternal 
womb, and its own body. Today the technical means show the child’s move-
ments, it sucks his/her finger. We wander if it concerns a primal experience 
that at the starting point results from chance or from instinct teleology, of in-
stincts moved by a search of fulfillment starting from a certain lack of pleasure 
tending to satisfaction. 
Step by step, an “effective system of instincts” is build up, in its play as 
congenital bud of the I, and its persistence as instincts system in the progres-
sive development of the I and of its world, together with the correlative sys-
tematic fulfillment and constitution of fulfilling forms configure an ontological 
horizon and horizon of these forms. This primal essence, this congenital primal 
disposition of the I, is a necessary presupposition of any constitution (Ms E III 
9, p. 4). Husserl calls “heritage” (Erbmasse) that sort of sedimentation of earli-





8 E. Husserl, Hua XV, p. 605. I have dealt with these issues more thoroughly in “¿Es la afectividad una 
ampliación de la razón ?” in Paideia Fenomenológica 3, Santa Fe, 2011 (in print), Coord. Rabanaque and 
Fornari. 
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5. CONATUS AS PRIMARY INSTITUTION OF BEING ALIVE? 
 
Is there a primary institution of the sense of being alive? 
The only case in which a primal institution is impossible is the experience of 
our own death. As the experience of one’s own death is the last one, from that 
moment on, as far as we know conscious no longer testify. 
The fact is that, usually, it is not possible to recognize the moment of the 
primal institution; anyway, whatever has sense for us stands out of a transcen-
dental history, i.e. of certain primal institution. The very moment in which the 
process of the institution took place, cannot be revisited, and therefore neither 
can our primal institution of the meaning of being alive. 
Concerning the meaning of being alive, I deem important to retrieve the 
concept of “conatus” in the way that Spinoza grasped it. The concept alludes to 
evidence presenting every existing thing as striving to continue existing. Such 
evidence might have worked as primal institution. In daily life and having such 
institution already taken place, the feeling of being alive can be a feeling of a 
certain superabundance. Looking at the joy expressed in the eyes of very 
young children one presupposes the child is enjoying such superabundance. 
Any way, in grown-up people the feeling of being alive can also emerge from a 
quiet or from an immense joy; i.e. it is presumably acceptable that the moment 
Spinoza grasped the experience he named “conatus”, expressed for him the 
very moment of the originally institution of the experience of being alive. 
 
 
6. ON THE “GREEN” OF THE GOLDEN TREE OF LIFE 
 
Goethe has definitely characterized the most outstanding traits of life by 
saying: “Young  friend, grey is every theory, but green is the golden tree of 
life”. 
It might happen that a phenomenological approach to this issue turns to be 
a theoretical abstraction. It seems advisable to quote a phrase from J. Ortega y 
Gasset, in order to approach the green of the tree of life. Ortega says: “Our 
most deeply rooted convictions are the most suspicious ones, they built up our 
limits, our frontier, our imprisonment. Life is an inconsequential thing, if it is 
not inhabited by a formidable pawing eagerness to push away its frontiers. One 
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lives inasmuch as one wants to live more and more”9. Ortega’s words describe 
a feeling of being alive that shows his experience of  “the green” of life. 
Husserl demands from the phenomenologist, and from the man of science, 
to carry out an archontic mission. Temporality has been shown as an essential 
trait of the primal consciousness, which equals life. Temporalization entails his-
toricity, consequently the question arises “where to?”, as well as the discussion 
on the legitimacy of that question. The question looks for the sense of life. 
Inasmuch as temporalization is the structure of life 10 , and as 
temporalization it is impregnated by teleology, which is “the form of all forms”, 
the proper of the telos is always attract toward what is better and superior. This 
facticity concerns the human being as well, in its effort to accomplish its being 
him/herself, in response to one’s own vocation. In order to accomplish the most 
fruitful development of the human being, Husserl counts upon the exercise of 
reason; which is capable of being creative in the sense of telos. Reason does 
not merely objectify, but also evaluates and cares for the practical realm. This 
idea of reason unifying three different functions, means a creative reason in 
accordance with the telos. 
A significative issue in Husserl is his interest for “renewal” (Erneurung) 
which does not merely mean change of the state of affairs, it alludes to en-
gagement of reason in order to overcome obsolete sedimentations. Green of life 
by Husserl concern this challenge to combat “lazy reason”. He stresses the ur-
gent obligation by those who are awake, to awaken his/her sleeping existing-
fellows, he or she, who are awake eludes the conventional state of affairs, on 
which lazy reason sleeps. For Husserl’s philosophy the green of life means chal-
lenge, engagement for one self and for the others, as well as for the communi-
ty. 
Ortega y Gasset’s concept of “vital reason” seems to be an adequate name 




9 J. Ortega y Gasset, La deshumanización del arte, Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 4ª. ed. 1954, pp. 23-
24 (my translation). 
10 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, § 27, p. 60 
